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SHOCK THERAPY, SOCIAL ENGINEERING,
AND FINANCIAL DISCIPLINE: WHAT DOES
AN INCREASINGLY FINANCIALIZED
WORLD MEAN FOR DEMOCRATIC
PARTICIPATION?
Layan Charara*
Over the last several decades, the Bretton Woods Institutions have come to
be drivers of policy in the realms of economic liberalization and develop-
ment, exceeding their original mandates of fostering monetary cooperation
and facilitating post-war reconstruction.   The structural adjustment pro-
grams of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have en-
gendered mixed results–delivering some countries from financial crises,
while inciting riots and compounding state failure in others.  Such varied
experiences suggest there is some disconnect between the conditions to
lending promulgated by these institutions and the realities on the ground.
This Note will trace the evolution of high conditionality lending vis-a`-vis a
number of nations and argue that a relationship between participatory de-
mocracy and structural adjustment programs should be forged in the inter-
est of successful lending and authentic national ownership of programs.
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INTRODUCTION
This Note traces the evolution of the Bretton Woods Institutions
(“BWI”) and high conditionality lending and argues that the design of
structural adjustment programs (“SAPs”) should accommodate the theory
of democratic participation to implement sustainable policies and avoid
aggravating crises.  High conditionality lending’s one-size-fits-all approach
has led to an untenable situation that exacerbates inequality and poor gov-
ernance, leaving “emerging markets” susceptible to crisis–a far cry from
the BWI’s initial mandate to strengthen state capacities and confront fi-
nancial crises.  Compliance with the BWI’s conditions for lending has in-
spired decreases in public spending, weakened labor laws, and left
developing nations vulnerable to increased speculation, all of which ulti-
mately contribute to the stifling of democratic participation.
This Note is organized into three thematic sections, all of which are
presented through the lens of participatory democratic theory.  The first
section provides the contours of the governance and operational structures
of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”).  The
second assesses high conditionality lending vis-a`-vis a number of nations.
The final section tenders a participatory, ownership-oriented approach to
the design and implementation of SAPs in the form of citizen action
groups.
I. THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS
Emerging from World War II as a hegemon–politically, economically,
and militarily–the United States spearheaded a gathering of delegates
from forty-four Allied nations in 1944 to agree upon a set of standards for
the post-war international monetary system.  The culmination of the so-
called Bretton Woods Conference was the creation of the IMF and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“IBRD”).1
Guided by the conviction that markets should be open to trade and the
cross-border movement of capital, the Articles of Agreement of the re-
spective institutions were adopted.  The IMF set out to foster international
monetary cooperation and maintain a system of fixed exchange rates cen-
tered on the US dollar, while the IBRD focused on the reconstruction and
development of territories affected by the war.
The IMF was charged with surveilling the exchange rates of its member
nations, ensuring their equitable economic growth, and controlling the fi-
nancial resources from which it could directly lend to members experienc-
ing difficulties with balancing payments. The IBRD was charged with
investing in reconstruction and development projects by lending to mem-
ber countries at market rates in addition to evaluating the viability of
projects and providing technical support.2  Since their establishment, the
1. Now known as the World Bank.
2. NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND THEIR
BORROWERS 7 (2006).
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BWI have come to service the same pool of clients and often clash on
projects and lending, despite distinctions in their mandates.
The BWI have exceeded their original mandates, focusing their efforts
since the 1970s oil shock and 1980s debt crisis on the “developing world,”
i.e. turning their attention and resources away from post-war Europe to
less industrialized nations in the global south and functioning as crisis
managers.  Over time, their objectives have come to encompass non-crisis
lending for poverty reduction, infrastructure development, and natural dis-
aster relief among other social and economic ills.3  The BWI’s fixation on
the global south translated into ensuring trade liberalization, privatization
of state-owned enterprises, opening up to foreign investment, and deregu-
lation of labor markets at any cost, i.e. unleashing the forces of the free
market on nations that were ill-equipped for such endeavors.4  The IMF
and World Bank impose conditions such as the aforementioned on nations
known as SAPs that seek financial support from them during crises,
namely in the form of macroeconomic policy reforms.  These programs are
also known as high conditionality lending.5
A.  Participatory Democracy and the Bretton Woods Institutions
Before surveying the effects of high conditionality lending on a number
of crisis-inflicted nations and tendering potential reforms, the governance
and operational structures of the BWI should be outlined in order to con-
textualize the forces that influence these institutions’ lending practices,
particularly with the theory of participatory democracy as a frame of
reference.
Participatory democracy, for the purposes of this Note, is a form of
governance grounded in the individual participation of citizens in political
decisions and policies that affect their lives, particularly in a direct manner
rather than through elected representatives.  The basic tenets of this the-
ory are located within Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s hypothesis about the role
of participation in a democratic polity.6  Rousseau’s theory of democratic
participation is animated by the conviction that society, through economic
equality and independence, provides the citizen with the security and inde-
pendence necessary for political equality and  independence.7  If these
conditions are met, citizens can organize and assemble both as indepen-
dent and interdependent individuals.8  “This is not so paradoxical as it
sounds,” according to Pateman, “because the participatory situation is
3. See Jane Harrigan & Paul Mosley, Evaluating the Impact of World Bank Structural
Adjustment Lending: 1980-87, 27 J. DEV. STUD. 3, 63 (1991).
4. WOODS, supra note 2, at 1–7.
5. “High conditionality lending” and “structural adjustment programs” are used in-
terchangeably throughout the Note.
6. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Whether the General Will Can Err, in THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT 40 (1762).
7. CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 22 (1970).
8. Id.
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such that each citizen would be powerless to do anything without the co-
operation of all the others, or the majority.”9  Rousseau describes this as
each citizen being excessively dependent on the republic, the republic be-
ing the collective citizenry.10
The three integrative functions Rousseau attributes to participation
undergird the arguments put forward in this Note.11  First, participation
increases the value of the individual’s freedom by enabling him to be his
own master.  Second, the participatory process ensures that no man or
group is the master of another, but rather all are equally dependent on one
another.  Third, participation increases feelings of belonging among indi-
vidual citizens.12
The sections of this Note that follow are informed by this theory of
participation.  This Note argues that the absence of participation within
the BWI and the greater global finance architecture is a critical barrier to
genuine economic growth and political stability during and in the after-
math of a crisis.  Translating Rousseau’s theory of participation from its
original peasant context into the Bretton Woods context can foster the
kind of participation that provides for the mutual dependency and benefits
Rousseau envisions in a participatory system.
B. Running Deficits in Democracy
With the Bretton Woods Conference colored by war in Europe, the
United States exploited its superior position in the global order and se-
cured an international agreement with minimal participation from Euro-
pean nations at war.13  Consequently, weaker nations could either
acquiesce in the new system or be left behind.  Under the adopted system,
each member country of the IMF is assigned a quota according to its rela-
tive position in the world economy.  This determines what each country is
required to contribute in capital subscriptions as well as its access to IMF
resources.14  The quota formula is the weighted average of GDP, open-
ness, economic variability, and international reserves.15  The IMF’s pri-
mary source of funding is members’ capital subscriptions, which are also
determined by the quota system.16
The quota system also determines voting shares within the IMF.  Each
IMF member’s voting share is comprised of basic votes plus one vote for
9. Id. at 23.
10. ROUSSEAU, supra note 6, at 82.
11. See PATEMAN, supra note 7, at 22–27.
12. Id.
13. WOODS, supra note 2, at 17.
14. IMF Quotas, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.imf.org/en/
About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/07/14/12/21/IMF-Quotas.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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every 100,000 Special Drawing Rights (“SDR”).17  When the quotas were
first determined, the United States required that its military allies should
have the largest quotas.18  Basic votes were created as an equalizing force,
unencumbered by quotas and allocated to all members regardless of size
or contribution.  When the quotas of developing nations appeared too
small relative to those of other nations, the IMF doubled them and set a
minimum quota, ensuring these smaller nations could more effectively
participate as members of the international community.19
Voting shares in the World Bank, which is comprised of four organiza-
tions, are allocated differently.20  This Note focuses only on the IBRD and
the International Development Association (“IDA”)—the public sector
lending arms of the World Bank.21  In the IBRD, each member state is
allocated one vote for each share of Bank capital stock it holds plus basic
votes.22  The World Bank is funded by four sources: paid-in-capital, re-
tained earnings, loan repayments, and borrowing on global capital mar-
kets.23  Members contribute capital proportional to their quotas, but this is
only a small portion of the Bank’s total funds.  The Bank borrows at the
lowest rates on the capital market and subsequently lends to developing
countries at higher rates, covering bank costs and generating net income.24
In the IDA, each member’s share of votes is allocated based on replen-
ishment schemes negotiated every few years.  Member contributions con-
stitute half of its total funding, and the other half comes from loan
repayments.25  The original voting structure of the IDA reflected initial
subscriptions, but it was then decided that the structure would not change
as replenishments varied, i.e. increasing contributions will not translate
into more power within the institution.26  Over the years, the United
17. Special Drawing Rights are an international reserve asset created for the IMF to
facilitate currency exchange among member states. The value of the SDR is calculated daily.
1 USD = 0.69 SDR at the time of writing (April 2018). See Special Drawing Rights, INT’L
MONETARY FUND (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/
01/14/51/Special-Drawing-Right-SDR for more information.
18. WOODS, supra note 2, at 22.
19. Id. at 23.
20. The World Bank is comprised of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (“IBRD”), the International Development Association (“IDA”), the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation (“IFC”), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(“MIGA”), and the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”).
21. The IFC and MIGA have an independent recourse mechanism in place for com-
plaints arising under private sector lending agreements. More information about the Office
of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman can be found here: http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/
about/.
22. Voting Powers, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leader
ship/votingpowers (last visited Mar. 6, 2018).
23. See WOODS, supra note 2, at 24.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 28.
26. Id. at 198.
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States’ contribution to the IDA has declined, yet it retains the largest vot-
ing share.27
The IMF and World Bank each have a respective Board of Governors
that function as their highest decision-making bodies.  In the IMF, the
Board consists of a governor from each member country.  Much of the
Board’s decision-making authority is delegated to executive directors
(“EDs”) elected by the Board.  This executive board, which is responsible
for the daily operations of the IMF, consists of 24 EDs representing the
189 member countries. The five largest shareholders – the United States,
Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom – are each represented
by their own ED in both institutions, while more than three-quarters of
member states are not directly represented, but rather grouped into con-
stituencies which are determined according to quotas.28  Each constitu-
ency is comprised of  between four and twenty-four nations that elect a
director to represent them as a collective, compounding the problem of
skewed voting on the Boards.29  In the IMF, for example, a total of 46
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are represented by two EDs.30  An Afri-
can constituency composed of twenty-four nations wields only 1.42% of
voting power; another African constituency of nineteen nations wields
only 3% of total voting power.31  In the World Bank, seven of the twenty-
five constituencies are comprised of one nation, while all of Sub-Saharan
Africa is divided into only three constituencies.32
EDs who represent each of the five most powerful member states indi-
vidually are directly accountable to the governments of those nations,
whereas the EDs of constituencies have only a tenuous responsibility to
represent the interests of the group.33  The Articles of Agreement of the
IMF require EDs to act as representatives of the institution and of their
nation.34  According to IMF legal counsel, “a director is not obliged to
defer to the views of his or her member states, nor to cast votes in accor-
dance with their instructions.  The votes of the director will be ‘valid even
if they are inconsistent with any instructions he may have received from
his constituents.’”35  Aggravating this disconnect between the votes of an
ED and the policy goals of those they represent is the inability of individ-
ual members of a constituency to remove an ED from office and the se-
27. Id.
28. Id. at 73.
29. Alnoor Ebrahim & Steven Herz, The World Bank and Democratic Accountability:
The Role of Civil Society, in BUILDING GLOBAL DEMOCRACY? CIVIL SOCIETY AND AC-
COUNTABLE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 58, 73 (Jan Aart Scholte ed., 2011).
30. WOODS, supra note 2, at 73.
31. Id. at 191.
32. Id. at 73.
33. Id. at 192.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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crecy which veils both IMF and World Bank board meeting proceedings.36
The IMF archive policy does not allow for the release of the full record of
board meetings until at least ten years have passed.  Moreover, neither
institution allows constituents to know the positions their representatives
took in the boardroom.37  These circumstances are not only inherently un-
democratic, but anti-participatory as well.  Individuals are denied any
stake or sense of belonging in this community that makes decisions that
bear directly on their daily affairs.
The governance structures of the BWI produce an imbalance in ac-
countability among nations.  Wealthy member states – those least affected
by the World Bank and IMF – dictate the institutions’ goals, expand their
activities, and have the most power to hold them accountable, even as
their contributions decrease over the years.38  This state of affairs height-
ens the burden on poor, borrowing nations and disincentivizes approach-
ing the BWI during times of need.39  As Woods describes the situation,
“the institutions themselves are today distributing money from poor to
rich countries as borrowers increasingly shoulder the burden not just of
bad loans but also of building up the reserves of each organization and of
remunerating creditor members in the IMF.”40  This problem is only exac-
erbated by the dearth of opportunities for poorer constituents to partici-
pate in the selection of EDs and policy-making decisions.
C.  A Culture of Lending
A disbursement culture pervades both BWI.  Within the Bank, staff
are more concerned with using the budget within its allocation period than
making sure Bank projects are sustainable and effective in the long-run.
There are no incentives to sustain projects beyond the short-term lending
period.  Staff members are discouraged from spending extended periods of
time at project locations for fear that they will “go native” and sympathize
too much with locals.41  There is high employee turnover, with few em-
ployees spending more than two years in the same country.42  Observable
evidence also indicates that far fewer staff resources are invested in the
programs of countries that spend significantly more time under IMF pro-
grams than more successful, temporary  users of IMF resources.43  When
these aspects of the lending culture interact with one another, the result is
a staff that is unable to hone real expertise or acquire deep knowledge of
the countries to which they lend.  This deepens the rift between the BWI
36. Id.
37. Id. at 193.
38. Id. at 199.
39. Id. at 200.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 207.
42. Id. at 161.
43. Id.
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and their borrowers, despite the BWI’s alleged emphasis on lending that
encourages local ownership, participation, and better governance in bor-
rowing countries.44
The 1991 Wapenhans Report, commissioned by the World Bank, re-
vealed that 37.5 percent of the Bank’s projects were failures.45  The report
focused on the pervasive approval culture within the Bank, wherein “staff
perceived project appraisals as internal marketing devices for securing
loan approval and achieving personal recognition.”46  The  report also
found that “pressure to lend overwhelmed all other considerations – in-
cluding project quality.”47  It also shed light on the lack of attention paid
to the implementation and supervision of loans and effects on sustainable
development.48  Numerous studies of the Bank’s internal structure reveal
similar findings: careers in the Bank have long been built by designing
projects that receive Board approval and meet project volume targets.49
Staff performance and promotion are heavily influenced by these
pressures.50
In both the World Bank and the IMF, there is not only pressure to
design projects and loan packages that will receive senior management’s
approval, but also to adhere to template proposals.  BWI staff purportedly
have an aversion to designing original projects in order to avoid personal
responsibility for failed projects.51  Template proposals allow staff to de-
flect blame onto the institutions as a whole while also allowing the IMF
and World Bank to respond to crises quickly.52  These pressures not only
perpetuate groupthink and conformity within the BWI, but more per-
versely, they result in a high degree of uniformity in projects that are ap-
plied to a diverse array of political economies.53  Still, the BWI pride
themselves on their ability to “stand above” local knowledge and to claim
a universally applicable expertise, based squarely in the discipline of eco-
44. Id. at 207.
45. Lori Udall, The World Bank and Public Accountability: Has Anything Changed?,
in THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND GRASSROOTS
MOVEMENTS 391, 401 (Johnathon A. Fox and L. David Brown eds., 1998).
46. Id. at 401.
47. Id.
48. Lewis T. Preston, Records of the Portfolio Management Task Force (Wapenhans
Report) and Follow-up, WORLD BANK GROUP ARCHIVES HOLDINGS, (Feb. 4, 2018),
https://archivesholdings.worldbank.org/exc-portfolio-management-wapenhans-task-force-ex
ecutive-directors-statements-recommendations.
49. PAUL J. NELSON, THE WORLD BANK AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS: THE LIMITS OF APOLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 90–91 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc.,
1995).
50. Id.
51. WOODS, supra note 2, at 160.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 160–61.
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nomics,”54 even when their projects inflict significant harm on borrowing
countries.
Ultimately, the governance and operational structures of the BWI pre-
sent few opportunities for the citizens of borrowing countries to partici-
pate in decision-making.  Moreover, the EDs of developing nations have
little say in policy design due to the skewed voting framework and have
little to no fidelity to the interests of the nations they represent.  Not only
are participatory processes absent, but the representative configurations
which the BWI boast are deficient as well.
II. HIGH CONDITIONALITY LENDING
Structural adjustment, also known as high conditionality lending, refers
to a set of economic conditions the IMF and World Bank impose as pre-
requisites for loans.55  These conditions are typically a combination of free
market-inspired policies such as trade liberalization and deregulation,
privatization, fiscal austerity, tax reform, exchange rate manipulation, and
currency devaluation.  This list of neoliberal reforms is known as the
“Washington Consensus,” as it has become the standard loan package of-
fered to countries in crisis by the Washington-based BWI.56  Although
these requirements are designed to encourage macroeconomic stability
and provide liquidity to cash-strapped governments, they often constrain
government behavior and sovereignty and occasion severe economic and
social harms.
High conditionality lending is justified by the assumption that borrow-
ing nations experiencing balance of payments troubles cannot make credi-
ble commitments to use loans for investment purposes absent stringent
conditions. Nations that turn to the IMF for assistance have been deemed
uncreditworthy by most creditors on the global market.  It is these coun-
tries that come within the purview of structural adjustment.57  Although
the IMF’s position as a lender of last resort is important in an increasingly
financialized world, the conditions imposed on borrowing nations that are
already experiencing economic troubles ultimately only exacerbate their
circumstances.  High external indebtedness and internal imbalances, com-
pounded by the IMF’s loan conditions, provide very little incentive or ca-
pacity for borrowers to undertake the necessary reforms to stabilize their
54. Id. at 64.
55. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, Art 5 §1: “Conditions governing use of the
Fund’s general resources,” IMF Articles of Agreement: “The Fund shall adopt policies on the
use of its general resources, including policies on stand-by or similar arrangements, and may
adopt special policies for special balance of payments problems, that will assist members to
solve their balance of payments problems in a manner consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement and that will establish adequate safeguards for the temporary use of the general
resources of the Fund.”
56. See WOODS, supra note 2, at 63.
57. See GRAHAM BIRD, IMF LENDING TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ISSUES AND EVI-
DENCE 74–75, 83 (1995).
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economies and service their debts.  According to Sachs, “IMF programs
are very frequently, if not typically, unsuccessful in restoring stability and
growth in countries beset with balance-of-payments and inflation
problems.”58
The IMF offers a variety of lending instruments contingent upon the
urgency of the balance of payments crisis, i.e. whether it is actual, prospec-
tive, potential, short-term, or medium-term.59  Upon the request of bor-
rowing countries, IMF loans are provided to assist them in efforts to
“rebuild their internal reserves, stabilize their currencies, continue paying
for imports, and restore conditions for strong economic growth, while im-
plementing policies to correct underlying problems.”60  The World Bank,
on the other hand, lends for specific development projects and provides
technical assistance.61
The rapid privatization required by structural adjustment increases un-
employment considerably and, when coupled with spending cuts and price
increases, may result in higher poverty rates.62  These circumstances culti-
vate fertile ground for insider deals and rent-seeking behavior.  Moreover,
inflation control and market liberalization reduce government revenues.
This especially harm small businesses, which ultimately face downward
pressure on their labor costs and may be driven out of business.  The fiscal
discipline required by the IMF and World Bank ultimately impairs citizen
protections and services and inflates wealth disparities.  The IMF itself
published an article in 2016 highlighting the components of its neoliberal
agenda that were oversold.63  In particular, the IMF conceded that remov-
ing restrictions on cross-border capital flows and fiscal consolidation, also
known as austerity, ultimately increased inequality, though the authors
were hesitant to censure other facets of IMF neoliberalism that have simi-
lar effects.64
The Washington Consensus prescriptions have been described as shock
therapy by observers due to the speed with which these radical reforms are
expected to be implemented and the adverse effects they have on borrow-
ing countries.65  Easterly defines shock therapy as a form of social engi-
neering that has been employed in the swift transition to capitalism in
58. JEFFREY SACHS, DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 270
(1989).
59. IMF Lending, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Mar. 8, 2018), http://www.imf.org/en/
About/Factsheets/IMF-Lending.
60. Overview of the IMF as a Financial Institution, INT’L MONETARY FUND 1 (2016),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/finop/2016/pdf/chapter1.pdf.
61. What We Do, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/what-we-do.
62. NELSON, supra note 49, at 21–22. See also WOODS, supra note 2.
63. See Jonathon D. Ostry et al., Neoliberalism: Oversold?, 53 FIN. & DEV. 38 (2016).
64. Id.
65. See WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST’S EFFORTS
TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND SO LITTLE GOOD 14 (2007).
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borrowing countries that eschews gradual democratic reforms.66  Attempts
by the BWI to engineer the societies of nations in the global south with
unaccommodating, underdeveloped institutions precipitated riots in sev-
eral countries, ran afoul of public institutions, furthered indebtedness and
economic downturn, and ultimately prolonged the dependence of borrow-
ing countries on the BWI.  Perhaps the most salient criticism of the high
conditionality lending practices of the IMF and World Bank is that, in
their quest for economic reform and development, they ignore or wish
away political realities.67  The two institutions acknowledge the need for
more holistic approaches to their mandates that adequately attend to the
social and structural constraints of development, but they have not yet
achieved this.68
It must be noted that there is also significant doubt as to whether IMF
programs were ever actually implemented in a number of cases, particu-
larly in Africa.  As many as 53 percent of IMF programs from 1979 to 1993
are considered failures,69 and 75 percent of World Bank adjustment loans
during this period experienced noncompliance issues.70  Despite noncom-
pliance with its conditions, which is ostensibly a barrier to further IMF
lending or receiving subsequent tranches of a loan package, the IMF con-
tinues to disburse loans to borrowers that cannot repay previous debts,
essentially creating IMF addicts.  “Once a country is in deep to the IMF,
with the country owing the IMF due to previous bailout packages,” East-
erly avers, “it is hard to get out. . . The probability of getting a new loan
does not go down with the number of IMF and World Bank adjustment
loans already received . . . In 2001, loans to prolonged users accounted for
half of all IMF lending.”71
The deficient record of implementation of IMF and World Bank pro-
grams is perhaps more appropriately attributable to the infeasibility of
their implementation.  This may explain why many countries, particularly
in Latin America, abandon reform programs they previously agreed to.72
A lack of citizen ownership may also explain such deficiencies, as there is
scant citizen participation in program creation and thus little incentive to
ensure program success on the ground.
A. Who Decides?
IMF and World Bank lending arrangements are negotiated by BWI
staff and a select group of officials from borrowing nations—namely from
66. Id.
67. WOODS, supra note 2, at 161.
68. Id.
69. Defined as a country not implementing twenty percent or more of the program’s
conditions.
70. WOODS, supra note 2, at 161.
71. EASTERLY, supra note 65, at 228.
72. See WOODS, supra note 2, at 161, 167.
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the Finance and Planning Ministries and the Central Bank.  These negotia-
tions are typically conducted clandestinely and enjoy relative insulation
from public institutions and political processes.73  The BWI benefited
from this independence for quite some time, relying on “sympathetic in-
terlocutors” in borrowing countries to sway the appropriate technocrats to
sign and implement such agreements without going through the full politi-
cal machinations.74  The IMF and World Bank are most persuasive in
highly centralized political systems, isolated from democratic, deliberative
processes.75  Woods contends that the influence of the IMF and World
Bank is high where economic policy is centralized and insulated from po-
litical pressures and tenuous where economic policy is less easily con-
trolled because of political processes and electoral cycles.76  In other
words, IMF and World Bank adjustment programs are best received with-
out public participation.  Since the “good governance” reforms under-
taken by the BWI in the 1990s, however, the process opened up under the
guise of transparency and accountability, albeit without public input.77
One of the most potent difficulties of negotiating with a sovereign bor-
rower is the diffusion of power within government.  Sachs posits that
power is often diffused to such an extent that officials negotiating agree-
ments with the BWI lack the authority to actually execute them.78  During
negotiations, the IMF and World Bank operate under the assumption that
there is one unified government actor that can be bound by the agree-
ment, but in reality, the reform policies to which the finance ministers
agree  are often of the nature that require the approval of  other branches
of government.79  As SAP negotiations foreclose input from the legislative
branches of borrowing countries, the public is effectively disenfranchised
and voiceless in the creation of programs that affect their daily lives, often
in destructive ways.  In fact,  domestic constituencies often oppose struc-
tural adjustment and austerity.  In order to deny their voice in the matter,
policymakers seek conditionality-laced reforms instead.80  This allows gov-
ernment officials to shift the blame onto the BWI when structural adjust-
ment programs run afoul of the citizenry, and these officials consequently
appear blameless when elections approach.  Not only are democratic defi-
cits present within the governance structures of the IMF and World Bank,
but such deficits ultimately mirror the lack of transparency borrowing gov-
ernments proffer to their constituents regarding SAP and policymaking in
general.
73. Id. at 73.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 79.
76. See id. at 83.
77. Id. at 77.
78. See SACHS, supra note 58, at 264.
79. Id. at 275.
80. See Chelsea Brown, Democracy’s Friend or Foe? The Effects of Recent IMF Condi-
tional Lending in Latin America, 30 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 431 (2009).
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B. Speed Lending
A recent body of literature has focused on the responsiveness of the
IMF to loan requests.81 The number of days that elapse between the time
a formal “letter of intent” is filed with the IMF and the time a loan is
actually disbursed is crucial because of its implications for containing cri-
ses and democratic deliberation.82  Current trends indicate the timespan
between crisis and IMF intervention has decreased over time in order to
mitigate aggravating factors and curb contagion.83  The IMF’s concern in
such circumstances is predicated on the depth of international financial
markets and the need to respond in a timely manner to prevent crises from
spreading as markets react to bad news.84  In its program design, the IMF
faces the continuing challenge of balancing the need to expeditiously stem
crises with the time needed to devise a program that will reverse the poli-
cies that led to the crisis.  Augmenting this balance is the IMF’s concern
for protecting its own resources.  Consequently, speed lending appears to
have curtailed democratic deliberation in this process.
Should the speed and efficiency necessary for responding to financial
crises come at the expense of democratic mechanisms to create and imple-
ment SAPs? Can an efficient balance between democratic deliberation
and SAPs be struck in an increasingly integrated global financial struc-
ture?  In two studies on IMF responsiveness, Mody and Saravia reveal
four findings: 1) the more severe a crisis, the quicker a program is imple-
mented, 2) the response to and scope of vulnerability has increased over
time, 3) the increase in value over time of affiliation with the United States
has led to rapid program closure, and 4) the need for speed has not under-
mined domestic democratic processes, nor do such domestic variables in-
fluence program decision or response speed.85  This section examines the
fourth finding through the lens of participatory democracy.
Mody and Saravia’s assessment suggests that, because political partici-
pation and economic openness reinforce one another and are thus in har-
mony, forgoing one for the other – i.e. curtailing deliberation for the sake
of economic openness – may not be troubling if their alignment is backed
by institutions that can accommodate rapid decision-making.86  This leads
to the inference that the countries that more frequently borrow from the
BWI do not fall under this category, although the authors leave the influ-
81. See, e.g., Ashoka Mody & Diego Saravia, From Crisis to IMF-Supported Program:
Does Democracy Impede the Speed Required by Financial Markets? (IMF Working Paper
WP/08/276, 2008).
82. A Letter of Intent is a document submitted to the Executive Board detailing the
policies the borrowing nation intends to implement in exchange for the provision of a loan
from the IMF.
83. See Mody & Saravja, supra note 81.
84. Id. at 3.
85. Id. at 22; See also Ashoka Mody & Diego Saravia, The Response Speed of the
International Monetary Fund, 16 INT’L. FIN. 189 (2013).
86. Mody & Saravia, supra note 81, at 18.
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ence of other political factors for further exploration.87  Mody and Saravia
also find that institutional checks that impose constraints on executives are
associated with more rapid program negotiation and that democracies
have adapted to the need for speed.88  They report that, during the global
onset of democratization in the 1970s, political processes initially slowed
the lending process, but in the 1980s, democracies began to accommodate
the need for expeditious lending.89  Variables they consider in reaching
this conclusion include a country’s PolityIV (the conventional measure of
political participation in democratic processes) and PolConIII (the extent
to which the legislature can constrain the executive) indicators and the
role of veto players in voicing concerns and delaying decisions.90  They
find that the democracy variable (PolityIV) is insignificant on its own, but
when the executive constraints (PolConIII) are introduced, decision
speeds increase.91
The two democracy variables Mody and Saravia employ in their study
quantify regime type and the presence of institutions and procedures
through which citizens can express their preferences about policies and
leaders respectively.92  Most intriguing about their findings is that such
conclusions are drawn without a full treatment of the insulation of the
IMF negotiation processes, though they do acknowledge that there are
political factors their study does not account for.93  While the presence of
democratic machinery in a borrowing government may indicate it does not
fall on the authoritarian end of the PolityIV scale, this does not necessarily
mean such machinery is employed by the citizenry during the negotiation
period with the IMF.94  In fact, except for the occasional input from non-
governmental or civil society organizations, the average citizen is excluded
from the process of designing SAPs.95  The clandestine SAP negotiations
undertaken by a select few government officials do not provide for the
direct involvement of citizens in decision-making that is idealized under
the theory of participatory democracy.  Moreover, the principal recipients
of IMF loans, discussed in the following section, were governed by author-
itarian or military regimes at the height of their borrowing and lacked the
institutional capacity and political will to accommodate the kind of partici-
pation the PolityIV measure presupposes, casting further doubt on the
utility of the indicators operationalized by Mody and Saravia.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 22.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 19.
91. Id.
92. See MONTY G. MARSHALL & KEITH JAGGERS, POLITY IV PROJECT (2007).
93. Mody & Saravia, supra note 81, at 18.
94. See section Who Decides?, supra p. 373.
95. Id.
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C. The Latin American Experience
The Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, often referred to as the
“lost decade,”96 is considered the posterchild of the need for speed as con-
cerns over the spread of crisis in the region were high.  Following the oil
price shocks of the 1970s,97 a number of Latin American countries were
unable to service their foreign debt, which was used to finance large cur-
rent account deficits.98  Banks in the United States and the IMF instituted
a cooperative effort to restructure  Latin American debt, which entailed
lending to pay off interest and imposing structural reforms to reconfigure
national economies.99
Under the auspices of the IMF, Latin American governments, includ-
ing Mexico, Argentina, and Bolivia, cut spending on infrastructure, educa-
tion, and healthcare, froze wages, increased prices on basic commodities,
and reduced subsidies – i.e. austerity, deregulation, and privatization.100
Still, the debts of these nations reached unsustainable levels.  By 1989, it
was clear they would not be able to service their debts and simultaneously
reinvigorate their economies.101  Inequality rose sharply due to plummet-
ing employment rates and increased poverty, and crime became more
prevalent.102  Anti-austerity riots transpired in 39 of approximately 80
countries that borrowed from the IMF between 1976 and 1992, and a few
carried over into the early 2000s.103  In Argentina, violent riots and looting
culminated in the death of at least sixteen people.104  In Bolivia, clashes
between civilians and the military resulted in twenty-five fatalities.105  In
Mexico City, angry farmers barricaded streets and government buildings,
and protests broke out in a number of cities.106  Despite similar unrest as a
result of structural adjustment, however, the democratic trajectories of Ar-
gentina, Bolivia, and Mexico diverged in radically different directions.
96. See, e.g., Margaret Daly Hayes, The U.S. and Latin America: A Lost Decade?, FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS (1988), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/central-america-caribbean/
1989-02-01/us-and-latin-america-lost-decade.
97. A series of energy crises, including the OPEC oil embargo, that shook oil prices
from 1967 to 1979 and led to a rapid buildup of international debt in the affected countries.
98. Jocelyn Sims & Jessie Romero, Latin American Debt Crisis of the 1980s, FEDERAL
RESERVE HISTORY, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/latin_american_debt_crisis#
working.
99. Id.
100. JOHN WALTON & JONATHON SHEFNER, Latin America: Popular Protest and the
State, in FREE MARKETS AND FOOD RIOTS: THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL ADJUSTMENT 101
(1994).
101. See id.
102. See Brown, supra note 80.
103. Lesley J. Wood, Anti-World Bank and IMF Riots, in THE WILEY-BLACKWELL EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MOVEMENTS 1 (David A. Snow et al. eds., 2013).
104. “Argentinian finance minister resigns after 16 die in riots,” THE GUARDIAN (Dec.
20, 2001), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/dec/20/argentina2.
105. Brown, supra note 80, at 441.
106. Id. at 432.
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By the end of 2001, the entire Argentine government resigned, and five
interim governments came and went.107  Civil and political liberties were
severely restricted, and the government declared a state of emergency.108
The Bolivian government imposed a state of martial law in 2001 after pro-
tests frenzied out of control.109  Frustrated and suffering due to increasing
unemployment, water privatization, and social service cutbacks, protesters
toppled two Bolivian governments.110  Heavy government repression in
Argentina and Bolivia in response to protest led to declines in their Free-
dom House measures.111  Meanwhile in Mexico, the government main-
tained its stability, improved civil liberties and electoral processes, and its
Freedom House score increased, despite public protest over
conditionality.112
In attempts to make sense of the disparate effects IMF lending had on
democracy in Latin America, Brown concludes that “[t]he simple presence
or absence of an IMF loan does not have a significant effect on democracy.
When more reforms are required as part of the loan package, however, the
effects on democracy are significant and generally negative.”113  In addi-
tion to fiscal reforms, legal and institutional reforms required by loan
packages engender harmful effects on democracy as well.  This may be
because the borrowing countries’ institutions do not function with the effi-
ciency and sophistication the reforms require.  The infeasibility of effectu-
ating the complete set of reforms  ultimately contributes to the
socioeconomic problems of borrowing nations.
In the case of Mexico, the IMF agreement required social changes that
improved or increased services that largely benefit the poor and working
classes, which may explain the relative success Mexico enjoyed compared
to other loan recipients.114  Institutional differences between Mexico, Ar-
gentina, and Bolivia can explain the democratic consequences as well.
Mexico did not impose a state of emergency, nor did it attempt to restrict
dissent.115  Moreover, Mexico’s close relationship with the United States
may indicate Mexico was under pressure to respect democratic proceed-
ings.116  Such outcomes, in concert with a nation’s ability to implement
reform policies, underscore the need to tailor IMF programs more nar-
rowly to account for domestic circumstances.
107. Id. at 432; “Argentina gets a new president for a day,” CNN (Jan. 1, 2002), http://
edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/12/31/argentina.resign/.
108. Brown, supra note 80, at 436.
109. Id. at 444.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 445.
113. Id. at 439.
114. Id. at 443.
115. Id. at 445.
116. Id.
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D. Crisis in Africa
While IMF conditionality may have yielded relatively positive out-
comes in some Latin American nations, the BWI’s lending programs in
Africa are largely considered to be abject failures.  Rather than attending
to the external variables that were straining African economies, the IMF
looked internally and concerned itself with reducing the size of the state in
the hopes of enhancing the role of the private sector.117  While African
leaders expressed their anxieties about the continent’s dependence on the
export of raw materials and its corollary susceptibility to external shocks
and constraints, the IMF required countries to undertake stabilization pol-
icies to reduce budget deficits and stem inflation.118
By 1990, seven of the eight states in the world that failed or collapsed
spent a significant period of time preceding collapse under an IMF pro-
gram.119  Six of these nations are in Africa—Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Le-
one, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire (presently Democratic Republic of the
Congo).120  Easterly asserts that spending significant periods of time under
an IMF program is associated with a higher risk of state collapse.121  Of
course, the political systems in these nations were already sickly and their
central banks poorly run.  But, this raises the question: why would the IMF
apply the same programs to nations with weak financial and political insti-
tutions as it does to those with relatively strong or functioning ones?
In Africa, the IMF possessed unreliable data and paid scant attention
to facts on the ground.  In Sierra Leone, the IMF intervened each time
there was a pause in the civil war throughout the 1990s—this after heavy
IMF involvement before the state collapsed in 1990.  While rebels were
terrorizing civilians, the IMF was granting additional loans.  The total debt
of borrowing countries in Africa doubled between 1979 and 1985 and
doubled again in the early 1990s.122  The value of their external debt as a
share of gross national product rose from around 25% in 1980 to more
than 80% in 1994.123  Woods observed that, as BWI involvement in Africa
increased, “indebted countries began to use bilateral loans from individual
donor agencies to repay the IMF and World Bank who were necessarily
their ‘preferred creditors.’  The result was both to create reverse flows of
funds to the IMF and to create strong political pressure for a change in the
debt strategy.”124
117. See WOODS, supra note 2, at 143.
118. Id. at 142.
119. EASTERLY, supra note 65, at 218.
120. Id. Table 4 (showing that, as of 1990, Burundi spent 62% of the ten years prior to
collapse under an IMF program; Liberia 70%; Sierra Leone 59%; Somalia 74%; Sudan 58%;
Zaire 73%).
121. Id.
122. WOODS, supra note 2, at 146–47.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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Most high conditionality lending conducted in Africa was Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility (“ESAF”), which has since been scrapped
following an IMF-commissioned report concluding that it did not work.125
ESAF prioritized balancing budgets without heeding long-term growth
consequences, pushed rapid privatization without regard for the ways poli-
ticians could use it for rent-seeking, encouraged countries to undertake
financial and exchange rate liberalization before stabilizing their econo-
mies, and operated based on exaggerated fiscal deficits.126  As for the
World Bank, its conditionality programs rested on the assumption that
there were too many civil servants in Africa, despite its own research dem-
onstrating otherwise.127  More appropriate guidance would entail helping
African nations achieve better governance through technical assistance,
institution-building, and public expenditure reviews.128
In designing their loan packages, the World Bank and IMF discounted
the realities of the market structures and institutional capacities of their
African constituents and focused instead on short-term targets that were
easily achievable.  They exhibited a willful blindness to the unsus-
tainability of African debt and the fact that stabilization and adjustment
were not working to reverse it.129  Borrowers are required to fulfill loan
conditions in order to receive a subsequent loan, but the IMF adopted the
practice of turning a blind eye with each new loan issued, resulting in defi-
cient compliance and massive debt accumulation.130
Woods recounts donor countries’ concerns in the 1980s about the pov-
erty that SAPs seemed to ignore, particularly in Africa.  The World Bank
and IMF had internal debates about how to protect the poor from struc-
tural adjustment and how social services may be channeled directly to the
poor, but in practice, there was little modification to their modus operandi,
which assumed that stabilization and adjustment were necessary to
achieve poverty alleviation.131  The IMF and World Bank insisted on their
uniform approach to crisis for quite some time.
E. Inching Toward Reform
Much of the criticism outlined above has been internalized by the IMF
and World Bank, and the institutions have signaled that they are inter-
ested in mitigating the concerns lodged against them.132  Maintaining a
stable international monetary system and fostering economic development
125. Id. at 153–56.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 157.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 158.
130. EASTERLY, supra note 65, at 228.
131. WOODS, supra note 2, at 160.
132. See The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots
Movements (Jonathon A. Fox & L. David Brown, eds.).
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across the globe are noble causes worthy of pursuing.  That being said,
accomplishing these goals is immensely challenging and requires a great
deal of nuance.  The BWI concede this much and have attempted to con-
sult with individuals and organizations on the ground in borrowing coun-
tries to soften the blow of their SAPs.133
Some of the most vocal critics of the IMF and World Bank are civil
society organizations (“CSOs”).  In the context of global finance, civil so-
ciety is understood as a political space where voluntary associations at-
tempt to shape policies, norms, and social structures.134  These
associations of citizens seek to change the rules that govern their social
lives.  The principal types of CSOs concerned with the IMF and World
Bank are research institutes, non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”),
business forums, labor unions, and faith groups.135  CSOs take up the
cause of the average citizen unacquainted with the global financial system.
The vast majority of people across the globe have scant, if any, aware-
ness of the major players in global finance and the immense power that
they wield.  States do not hold referenda on issues related to financial reg-
ulation, and legislatures have little, if any, direct involvement or power to
supervise the transnational institutions that comprise the global financial
architecture. There is a significant rift between the “beneficiaries” of
global financial regulation and those who transmit policy from above.
CSOs have attempted to narrow this gap through sustained protest and
advocacy efforts.  They made significant inroads in accountability with re-
spect to BWI projects and policies but have seen limited success at the
Executive Board level or with respect to staff performance incentives.
The BWI began their direct engagements with civil society in the
1970s, specifically with environmental groups concerned about the impacts
World Bank projects have on human populations, ecosystems, and the cli-
mate.  Environmental groups found success in the 1980s with the World
Bank’s adoption of the Environmental Impact Assessments.136  In 1995,
the World Bank created the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review
Initiative (“SAPRI”) in which over 1200 civil society associations from
across the globe participated.  SAPRI “was conceived as a collaborative
exercise in which the World Bank, civil society organizations, and govern-
ment officials would agree upon methodology and jointly assess the im-
pacts of structural adjustment.”137  The initiative concluded with the
133. See, e.g., the IMF’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the World Bank’s Civil
Society Poicy Forum.
134. CIVIL SOCIETY AND GLOBAL FINANCE 11, 22 (Jan A. Scholte & Albrecht Schnabel
eds., 2002).
135. Jan A. Scholte, Civil Society and the Governance of Global Finance, in CIVIL SOCI-
ETY AND GLOBAL FINANCE 11, 22 (Jan A. Scholte & Albrecht Schnabel eds., 2002).
136. See Jose O. Castaneda, The World Bank Adopts Environmental Impact Assess-
ments, 4 PACE Y.B. INT’L L. 241 (1992); Alnoor Ebrahim & Steven Herz, The World Bank
and democratic accountability: the role of civil society, in BUILDING GLOBAL DEMOCRACY?:
CIVIL SOCIETY AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE 67–68, (Jan Aart Scholte ed.).
137. Ebrahim & Herz, supra note 136, at 69.
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World Bank accepting the findings but falling short of revising its
policies.138
The World Bank later redefined its approach to lending for low-income
countries with the launch of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(“PRSP”).  These Papers were hailed as an embrace of more participatory
practices that allow member countries to prepare reports on their poverty
levels and to develop strategies to eliminate poverty with the World
Bank’s assistance.  Scholte reasons the BWI may have resorted to this ap-
proach due to the very visible public demonstrations against the institu-
tions, which are an important counterweight to the susceptibility of
consultations to co-optation.139  The World Bank described the PRSP as a
resolution of the tension between conditionality and sovereignty, claiming
it was “a crucial step towards greater national ownership of development
programs which is essential for increased effectiveness of external assis-
tance.”140  The IMF agreed and expressed its pleasure that member coun-
tries would take ownership of poverty reduction.  Despite these
endorsements, the PRSP have been widely criticized.
Van de Walle describes the PRSP as a form of ventriloquism, wherein
countries have to guess what programs the IMF and World Bank will ap-
prove.141  The PRSP ultimately result in the suggestion of the same condi-
tions the BWI impose, a dubious attempt at handing over the reins and
providing countries with the opportunity to take real ownership of solu-
tions to national problems.  Interestingly, Scholte observes that PRSP con-
sultations chiefly facilitate dialogue between CSOs and governments
rather than CSOs and global agencies.142  When the World Bank does di-
rectly engage CSOs, observers maintain that the consultations often fall
flat because it rarely indicates what it hopes to achieve from certain con-
sultative processes, clarifies what issues are or are not open for considera-
tion, or what policy options are feasible.143  Moreover, the World Bank is
not transparent about how reviews inform policy reforms, bolstering the
perception that these institutions are not receptive to public input.144  The
Bank asserts, however, that CSOs have unrealistic expectations.145
Due to the sweeping campaigns waged against the institutions for their
alleged lack of accountability and transparency, the BWI respectively ap-
pointed civil society liaison officers and organized a Civil Society Policy
138. Id.
139. Jan A. Scholte, Conclusion, in BUILDING GLOBAL DEMOCRACY? CIVIL SOCIETY
AND ACCOUNTABLE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 306, 318 (Jan A. Scholte ed. 2011).
140. EASTERLY, supra note 65, at 146.
141. Id.
142. Jan A. Scholte, Civil Society and IMF Accountability, in BUILDING GLOBAL DE-
MOCRACY? CIVIL SOCIETY AND ACCOUNTABLE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 78, 90 (Jan A.
Scholte ed. 2011).
143. Ebrahim & Herz, supra note 136, at 69.
144. Id. at 71.
145. Id. at 69.
Spring 2018] Shock Therapy, Social Engineering, & Financial Discipline 383
Forum at their annual meetings.146  In 1981, an NGO-World Bank Com-
mittee was in operation but became defunct by the early 2000s.147  A per-
manent, institutionalized consultation with CSOs is absent altogether at
the IMF, though it issued a guide on consultations with CSOs in 2003.148
The World Bank continues to encourage consultations with civil society,
but they have become more of a tick-the-box exercise with no real conse-
quences for policy reforms rather than a genuine attempt to account for
the concerns of affected people.  Furthermore, both World Bank and IMF
officials tend to treat civil society consultations as unilateral briefings as
opposed to a two-way dialogue.149
In the instances that the IMF has granted CSOs an audience, they have
largely been through a hegemonic lens, reinforcing the structures within
the institution that subordinate weaker borrowing nations and reinforce
the undemocratic nature of its stratification.  To the extent civil society
made the IMF more accountable, these efforts tended to legitimate the
existing framework of IMF operations—that is, “a reformist quality that
adjusts Fund practices while remaining within the dominant patterns of
world order (e.g. of capitalism and Western modernity).”150
Hegemonic characteristics are also observable on the occasions the
IMF opens itself up to public scrutiny.  When interrogating who the IMF is
accountable to, it is equally, if not more, important to ask for whom the
IMF makes itself transparent.  The IMF directs its transparency campaigns
at English-speaking, financially-literate audiences with access to the in-
ternet and/or specialist libraries.151  These efforts bypass those who are
most acutely affected by the IMF’s policies.  The institution tried to reme-
diate this by making its website available in different languages, but the
substance is still highly technical and does not divulge information on the
political and social concerns at stake in IMF activities.152
IMF consultations with civil society to date predominantly engage
groups in the global north and exclude marginalized groups such as indige-
nous peoples, women, non-Christian groups, disabled persons, and peas-
ants among others.  This policy of exclusion is informed by the misguided
assumption that stakeholders who lack technical expertise have no role to
play in policy deliberations.  Additionally, the content of IMF consulta-
tions with CSOs does not stray from the paradigmatic Keynesian, ne-
oliberal approach to economics.  Consequently, these engagements,
operating in concert with the lending pressures and disbursement culture
that permeate the BWI’s operations, reinforce the structural inequalities
146. Scholte, supra note 134, at 316.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 318.
150. Scholte, supra note 142, at 80.
151. Jan Aart Scholte, Civil society and IMF accountability, in BUILDING GLOBAL DE-
MOCRACY?: CIVIL SOCIETY AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE 86, (Jan Aart Scholte ed.)
152. Id. at 86.
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of the BWI and the construction of the global financial system rather than
remedying them through more participatory processes.
F. Democratic Deficits Within Civil Society Organizations
CSOs can certainly claim victories in making the BWI more accounta-
ble and transparent, but these associations suffer from their own demo-
cratic deficits as well.  Civil society is defined in a number of ways, but it is
broadly understood as a space for citizens to assemble and deliberate the
circumstances of their collective life.153  Civil society engagement is an ex-
ercise in citizenship, whereby members of the same polity come together
to play a part in the acquisition, distribution, and exercise of power that
affects their daily lives.  However, CSOs are not always concerned with
the issues facing ordinary citizens.  Some CSOs embrace mandates that are
inspired by hate and greed.  Some of their activities have negative conse-
quences.  Many of them are not forthcoming about their goals, funding,
and internal operations.  Civil society participation in the international fi-
nancial system is a means to an end, but it is not the end in and of itself.
CSOs can be instrumental in advancing democratic interests and pro-
viding public benefits.  Particularly in the context of global finance, CSO
engagement furnishes opportunities for public education by raising citi-
zens’ awareness and understanding of global finance; furthers good gov-
ernance initiatives by amplifying the voices of stakeholders and shifting
policy-making in a more participatory direction; increases public trans-
parency and accountability; and enhances social cohesion.154  A number of
CSOs pursued economic literacy projects in countries under IMF pro-
grams, including Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, and Sierra Leone.  For example,
the Malawi Equal Justice Network (“MEJN”) and Civil Society for Pov-
erty Reduction (“CSPR”) in Zambia produced lay versions of their gov-
ernments’ agreements with the IMF.  These kinds of initiatives are rare
and short-lived, but they demonstrate the good CSOs can accomplish
within the global financial system.155
The importance of and progress made by CSOs in the global financial
architecture should not be discounted, but the democratic shortcomings of
their construction cannot be ignored either. Under the guise of lending
their resources and visibility to the voiceless, CSOs often displace those
they purport to speak on behalf of in consultative processes.  One major
risk when NGOs enter the fray is the unofficial transfer of power from
elected representatives to unelected civil society activists and bureaucrats.
The role civil society has effectively taken on is the same as that of govern-
ment officials, resulting in the same lack of engagement with the average
citizen affected by global financial regulations and thus frustrating pros-
153. See Jan A. Scholte, Global Governance, Accountability, and Civil Society, in
BUILDING GLOBAL DEMOCRACY? CIVIL SOCIETY AND ACCOUNTABLE GLOBAL GOVERN-
ANCE 8, 33–34 (Jan Aart Scholte ed. 2011).
154. Scholte, supra note 142, at 29.
155. Scholte, supra note 142, at 85.
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pects for direct participation.  The displacement of citizens by CSOs runs
counter to the theory of participation this Note hinges on. As such, their
involvement cannot be considered truly participatory or constructive for
achieving national ownership of BWI reforms.
III. ON OWNERSHIP AND PARTICIPATION
The IMF defines policy ownership as “a willing assumption of responsi-
bility for an agreed program of policies, by officials in a borrowing country
who have the responsibility to formulate and carry out those policies,
based on an understanding that the program is achievable and is in the
country’s own interest.”156  This conception of ownership does not require
that officials create the policies in order for a government to own them,
nor must the policies be independent of conditionality.  What it does re-
quire is a government to appreciate the benefits of the policies and accept
responsibility for them.157  As discussed, only a select few individuals from
borrowing countries negotiate with the IMF.  Their “ownership” of the
policies negotiated with the IMF, whether they initially approve of them
or not, does not translate into national ownership.  The isolation of this
process marginalizes the public that is affected by the negotiated policies.
Framing ownership in this manner is inherently undemocratic and
exclusionary.
Ownership is necessary for a program’s success.  The IMF acknowl-
edges this and touts its Article IV consultations as a vehicle for borrowing
countries to design and implement economic reforms on their own
terms.158  The World Bank similarly presents its PRSP as a panacea for the
criticism it receives.159  Article IV of the IMF Articles of Agreement
promulgates a number of obligations and surveillance arrangements in
pursuit of “the continuing development of the orderly underlying condi-
tions that are necessary for financial and economic stability.”160  Article
IV consultations occur on an annual or a biennial basis with all 189 mem-
bers of the IMF.  The IMF consults with each member government in an
attempt to assess its economic health and advise on macroeconomic poli-
cies.  In many countries, the Article IV missions also engage with a selec-
tion of CSOs.161  Given the foregoing discussion of IMF interactions with
civil society over time, however, it is difficult to imagine the IMF lending
itself to truly participatory discourse.  CSO inclusion in Article IV consul-
tations is more likely treated as another tick-the-box affair.
156. IMF, Strengthening Country Ownership of Fund-Supported Programs, at 6 (Dec. 5,
2001), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/strength/120501.pdf.
157. James M. Boughton & Alex Mourmouras, Is Policy Ownership An Operational
Concept?, at 3 (IMF Working Paper 2002).
158. Scholte, supra note 142, at 89.
159. Id. at 18.
160. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, Art. 4, §1.
161. Scholte, supra note 142, at 89.
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The IMF Executive Board affirmed that ownership is “essential to the
successful and sustained implementation of a program of economic poli-
cies” and that “conditionality cannot compensate for a lack of program
ownership.”162  Nevertheless, creditors and debtors often clash in defining
ownership.  Borrowing governments assert that it is the prerogative of the
sovereign to decide what measures are necessary for its economic recov-
ery, whereas creditors are concerned with safeguarding their resources and
ensuring their investment sees a return, or at least does not generate a
loss.  Neither of these interpretations consider direct citizen engagement.
Given the degrees of separation between the average citizen and the gov-
ernment official negotiating with the BWI, the debtor definition is particu-
larly inadequate.  The purpose of this Note is to develop a counterweight
to traditional conceptions of “domestic ownership,” namely “citizen own-
ership” achieved through processes informed by a theory of participatory
democracy that do not impinge on the sovereign’s right to devise and im-
plement economic policies.
Observers of IMF lending contend that true domestic ownership of
SAPs is found in situations where the country would have adopted similar
policies in the absence of IMF auspices, defining such ownership as “the
extent to which a country is interested in pursuing reforms independently
of any incentives provided by multilateral lenders.”163  That is to say, na-
tional objectives for reform align with those of the IMF and should osten-
sibly make it easier for SAPs to receive domestic support because they do
not appear to be a foreign imposition.164  Reference to “national” objec-
tives in the participatory context should not, however, point to the goals of
the government officials who negotiate the policies, but rather to those of
the citizenry that is most directly affected by them.
Ownership, according to Khan and Sharma, “is intricately connected to
trust in domestic institutions, effectiveness of political structures, and
whether the government—negotiating on behalf of its citizens—has suffi-
cient support to speak for a fair majority.”165  The secrecy with which IMF
programs are negotiated and the general disdain for austerity and struc-
tural adjustment cast doubt on whether government negotiators are au-
thorized interlocutors from a participatory perspective and whether true
domestic ownership of the policies is possible under such circumstances.
This situation, often found in principal-agent relationships, is described as
“moral hazard in teams,” wherein the principal’s payoff depends on the
efforts of other agents.166  IMF programs are negotiated with a select few
162. IMF, Public Information Notice: IMF Executive Board Discusses Conditionality
(Mar. 21, 2001), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/pn0128.
163. Allen Drazen, Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Econ-
omy Approach, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 36, 37. (2002).
164. Mohsin Khan & Sunil Sharma, IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Ad-
justment Programs, 18 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 227, 235 (2003).
165. Id. at 237.
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government representatives, but the success of the programs depends on
other stakeholders in society, including government ministries, civil soci-
ety, and the general population.167
A participatory conception of ownership includes the average citizen in
this group of affected stakeholders, as ownership by the authorities does
not directly translate to citizen ownership.  True ownership, as Drazen
contends, negates the need for conditionality.168  If the proposed policies
are truly in the nation’s best interest, conditionality should not be neces-
sary to compel compliance.  Drazen’s findings demonstrate that only when
a government faces internal opposition does conditionality play an impor-
tant role in policy implementation, often to the detriment of the general
welfare.169  The final section of this Note proposes a method of reconciling
these tensions.
A. Prospects for Participatory Processes
There are certainly challenges to the viable incorporation of direct citi-
zen participation in a highly technical and expansive enterprise like global
finance.  It is an endeavor that requires serious introspection and demands
a deep interrogation of the limitations of representative democracy.  The
current state of global governance is hinged upon the successful transfer of
decision-making power from the electorate to the elected, who ultimately
constitute the government that acts on behalf of the nation in the interna-
tional arena.  What this Note has showcased thus far is that this represen-
tative construction falls short with respect to BWI programming,
necessitating more participatory processes.
The major theorists of participatory democracy identify its three
prongs as participation, control, and education.170  Participatory democ-
racy  “requires that the decision-making process be continuous and signifi-
cant, direct rather than through representatives, and organized around
issues instead of personalities.”171  It requires a decision-making process
by the affected, for the affected – constituted by popular control of
agenda-setting, decision-making, and implementation.  Most important in
the Bretton Woods context is the need for participatory democratic theory
to serve as a bulwark against the paternalistic approach of these institu-
tions when lending.
Benello posits that “[w]hat is engendered by the large bureaucratic or-
ganizations that dominate our social system is an inflexibility of purpose
and a vested interest in the status quo. Relationships between the various
167. Id.
168. See Drazen, supra note 163, at 37.
169. Id. at 64–65.
170. Joel D. Wolfe, A Defense of Participatory Democracy, 47 REV. POL. 370, 371
(1985).
171. See Dimitrios Roussopoulos & C. George Benello, Introduction, in PAR-
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institutional orders. . .thus become a matter of conflict or, at best, compro-
mise, rather than a matter of harmonization of interests.”172  He refers to
this social order as a market system, perpetually in pursuit of selfish inter-
ests at the expense of the ongoing dialectic between the individual and the
collective.  Benello concedes that the role of the technical expert is central
to achieving group purpose, but technical decisions have social dimensions
as well.  Social decisions cannot be made for the people by an expert.  The
expert should present consequences of various lines of decisions, while
leaving discussions about value tradeoffs to the affected group.173
There is no single, correct technical solution because “[c]ustoms,
norms, ethical and social considerations inject themselves at every point,
and groups made up of those affected are the only valid interpreters of
such norms and values.”174  So how can Benello’s framework of participa-
tion be operationalized with respect to the BWI?  One possibility is to
tailor the concepts underlying Community Development Corporations
(“CDCs”) and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) to
the context of global finance in a manner that provides for the autonomy
and education participatory democratic theory requires.
CDCs are nonprofit organizations that originated during the civil rights
movement to provide programs and services and to engage in activities
that promote community development, specifically within African-Ameri-
can communities.  CDCs take various forms, but the majority exhibit the
following features:175
1) They are institutions focused on developing a specific neighborhood or
area and are concerned with local problems.
2) Their corporate structure offers shares or membership primarily to re-
sidents of that selected area.
3) The goals of CDCs are many, but they always include the creation of new
economic institutions.  Because they span the civic interests of an entire
neighborhood and offer shares or membership to all residents, there is gen-
erally a clear preference for community ownership of the economic institu-
tions.  Despite this preference, they also provide services and capital to
privately owned businesses of residents.
4) Their constituencies are most often economically and socially disadvan-
taged.  The purpose of CDCs is to change the social institutions that main-
tain the economically and socially disadvantaged position of those
groups.176
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It is important to confine analysis of CDCs to their civil rights context
in order to emphasize their purpose beyond business development, namely
that they are a means of enhancing and uplifting marginalized communi-
ties.  To understand the importance of CDCs not just for the African-
American community but disadvantaged peoples across the globe, the in-
stitutional impoverishment of these groups cannot be discounted.
CDCs were not founded under the auspices of outside sponsors.  They
are truly the product of those they are designed to serve and thus are more
attuned and responsive to local needs.  Their principal goal is to provide
the poor and disenfranchised with “meaningful participation” in their own
institutions, defined as “when a person has a sense of his involvement in a
total enterprise, a sense of where his effort fits into an overall plan, when
he identifies with the collective goals, has a feeling of efficacy with respect
to the accomplishment of the goals, and has a stake in the results of the
total enterprise.”177  This sense of meaningful participation can be
achieved through financial education initiatives that encourage citizens to
be active participants in the global financial architecture.
One of the principal goals of the CFPB, created in the wake of the
2008 financial crisis, is to encourage consumers to take control of their
economic lives via empowerment, enforcement, and education initia-
tives.178  The CFPB website offers a wealth of resources – in a number of
languages – in pursuit of financial empowerment of the most vulnerable in
society.  These resources include materials on community training, finan-
cial coaching, webinars, and youth financial education.179  Financial em-
powerment and literacy are key for effective participation and policy
ownership in the global finance context.  The examples of the MEJN in
Malawi and CSPR in Zambia, which disseminated lay versions of their
governments’ agreements with the IMF, should be recreated to promote
general financial literacy and direct citizen engagement with the BWI.
This Note envisions a fusion of the grassroots organization and owner-
ship concepts of CDCs and the educational objectives of the CFPB in the
form of citizen action groups (“CAGs”). Transplanting these concepts to
the poor and marginalized in the global south is ambitious and completely
contingent on the ability of these people to mobilize and organize them-
selves.  Even more aspirational is the idea that the IMF or World Bank
would ever engage such groups.  But it is possible and worth exploring
because the BWI are public institutions that are obligated to be accounta-
ble to those they serve.  Their legitimacy depends on it.  Armed with the
educational and technical expertise of CSOs, these citizen action groups
can participate in consultations about the social and economic conse-
quences of structural adjustment that they are better positioned to value.
177. Id. at 57–63.
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B. Necessary Reforms
CAGs, if properly fashioned, can fill the lacuna between SAP design
and promoting sustainable growth and development.  These groups would
satisfy the three requirements of participatory democratic theory – partici-
pation, control, and education – by providing citizens with a medium for
direct participation in decision-making processes that impact their lives;
control via opportunities to take initiative and ownership within these or-
ganizations; and education via cooperation with civil society and the BWI.
It must be stressed that this participatory framework demands engage-
ment with government.  CAGs are a complement to the government and
are not intended to displace the sovereign in negotiations with the BWI.
Their purpose is to humanize the policy design process and remind those
creating SAPs that there are human beings on the receiving end of these
policies.  CAGs should ultimately operate in a manner that disrupts the
purely economic-theoretical approach to structural adjustment and com-
pel the BWI and government representatives to consider the social conse-
quences of their policies.
CAGs can transport citizens from the traditional, passive position the
BWI and sovereign governments relegated them to and offer opportuni-
ties for active participation.  This conception of participation is “[b]uilt on
a belief that citizens can be trusted to shape their own future . . . [and] uses
local decision-making and capacities to steer and define the nature of an
intervention. . .It champions the sovereignty of people over the sover-
eignty of a state,”180 while leaving room for traditional government opera-
tions.  Coupling the CFPB and CDC’s advocacy for education, community
organizing, and local development with this conception of participation,
the role this Note imagines for citizen involvement via CAGs is clear.  Col-
lective empowerment and a belief in self-help are essential for active par-
ticipation.  CAGs offer a way to achieve this and a remedy for the
disenfranchisement that citizens in borrowing nations experience.  These
groups can provide affected citizens with the meaningful participation
CDCs imagine.  Citizens would no longer be sidelined by the state and
instead directly engage with the institutions that promulgate policies that
affect their social, political, and economic lives.  Citizens have a direct
stake in the consequences of structural adjustment, and they are better
positioned than the BWI to assess those consequences and to make value
judgments about what policies should be instituted.
As for the educational aspect of this framework, there is ample room
for cooperation with the BWI themselves and CSOs.  CSOs are often com-
prised of bureaucrats and technocrats capable of understanding and trans-
lating agreements and consultations with the BWI and pertinent data.
Furthermore, they are capable of waging public information campaigns to
increase financial literacy and awareness of government undertakings.
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CSOs are best positioned to take on a role similar to the CFPB.  Financial
literacy initiatives similar to those in Malawi, Sierra Leone, and Zambia
should be replicated in order to facilitate direct citizen participation in
consultations with the BWI.  This is especially important for people on the
margins of society who are disproportionately affected by structural ad-
justment and have little to no stake in government proceedings, e.g. indig-
enous peoples and minorities.  If CSOs initiate and maintain effective
campaigns to inform the public about the consequences of poorly-de-
signed SAPs, significant interest in learning about the programs and par-
ticipation in their creation may be fostered.  This may also allay concerns
about CSOs displacing average citizens and offer an opportunity to
achieve their goals in a concrete way.
This kind of information campaign would require much more trans-
parency from the BWI, including information from Executive Board meet-
ings and their archives, as well as a willingness to engage CAGs.  But if the
BWI decide to pursue authentic reforms within their governance and op-
erational structures, direct engagements with citizens will lend them a
great deal of credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents and
encourage nations in crisis to once again seek the help of the much-
maligned lenders of last resort.  Not only will a more participatory ap-
proach to lending make the BWI more accountable to the recipients of
their loans, but it will provide for more sustainable policies that engender
authentic economic growth and development.  Furthermore, offering citi-
zens a seat at the negotiating table may have the corollary effect – or
boomerang effect – of making governments more accountable to their citi-
zens and encouraging better governance.
C. Reconfiguring the Bretton Woods Institutions
Empowering communities is essential for successful and sustainable
structural adjustment.  The IMF’s posture as a lender of last resort, how-
ever, presents a significant obstacle to the incorporation of participatory
processes in the midst of crisis.  Sustainable policies that foster real growth
have proven elusive in the experience of the BWI.  A reconfiguration of
their mandates could solve this.  As this Note highlights, the World Bank
and IMF’s policy approaches are animated by a disbursement culture that
is compounded by a need for speed.  With the resources they have at their
disposal, however, they can and should assign staff to projects for longer
periods of time to allow them to develop regional and country-specific ex-
pertise in order to have tailored SAPs ready if and when they are needed.
The BWI may undertake multilateral initiatives with other international
and regional organizations to monitor the political and social circum-
stances of their constituents in concert with their typical economic surveil-
lance activities.  If each constituent nation is assigned a permanent staff,
whether locally or remotely, that regularly consults with CAGs and CSOs
on the ground in addition to sovereign governments, the disasters that fol-
low many BWI lending schemes can be avoided.  All that is required is less
392 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 7:363
insularity and more participation, and the need for speed will not be
jeopardized.
CONCLUSION
There is indeed latitude in the global financial architecture to accom-
modate the theory of democratic participation.  As public institutions, the
BWI are well-positioned, and in fact obliged, to heed the concerns of the
people their policies directly affect.  The representative approach cur-
rently employed, both within the BWI and in their sovereign counterparts,
demonstrates an inability and unfortunate resistance to lending an audi-
ence to affected citizens.  Lukewarm attempts at reform have unsurpris-
ingly fallen flat as they appear primarily to be face-saving initiatives with
no real force.  In addition to the governance reforms prescribed by schol-
ars and observers, the BWI would do well to collaborate with local part-
ners and affected citizens in the design of SAPs to rectify their past
mistakes.  A more participatory process with direct citizen participation in
the form of CAGs can bolster prospects for sustainable growth and stabil-
ity and enhance the credibility of the BWI.  Restructuring the BWI based
on the theory of participatory democracy and no longer limiting engage-
ments to national representatives in official capacities is ultimately for the
benefit of all parties.  Such a restructuring also aligns with Rousseau’s
three integrative functions of participatory democracy by allowing affected
individuals to be master of their fate and enhancing their sense of belong-
ing within the BWI and their local communities.
